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The	  First	  Time	  as	  Tragedy,	  the	  Second	  as	  Farce?	  	  
Lebanon’s	  Nascent	  Petroleum	  Sector	  and	  the	  Risks	  of	  Corruption	  	  	  Abstract	  
This	   article	   analyses	   the	   risks	   of	   corruption	   in	   Lebanon’s	   nascent	   governance	   structures	  
established	   in	   preparation	   for	   a	   thriving	   petroleum	   sector.	   Engaging	   with	   comparative	  
theory	  on	  the	  ‘oil	  curse’,	  the	  article	  assesses	  the	  risks	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  institutional	  and	  
regulatory	  measures	  and	  policy	  tools	  that	  have	  thus	  far	  been	  developed	  down	  the	  sector’s	  
value	   chain	   and	   including	   revenue	   management	   and	   expenditure.	   Lebanon’s	   political	  
settlement,	   or	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   its	   political	   decision-­‐making	   process	   evolved	   since	   the	  
Ta’if	   Accord,	   consistently	   caused	   disappointing	   outcomes	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   sound	  
institution-­‐building	   and	   countering	   corruption;	   despite	   signs	   of	   awareness	   of	   the	   large	  
stakes	   involved,	   this	   tendency	   is	   once	  again	  discernible	   in	   the	   country’s	   preparations	   for	  
petroleum	  sector	  governance.	  	  	  	  	  Further	  exploration	  still	  needs	   to	  confirm	  an	  anticipated	  25	   to	  30	   trillion	  cubic	   feet	  of	  gas	   and	   440	   to	   660	   million	   barrels	   of	   oil	   deposits	   off	   the	   coast	   of	   Lebanon.1	   The	  country’s	  Exclusive	  Economic	  Zone	  (EEZ)	  is	  part	  of	  the	  Levant	  Basin,	  sharing	  territorial	  waters	  in	  the	  eastern	  Mediterranean	  with	  Israel,	  Gaza,	  Syria	  and	  Cyprus,	  that	  combined	  are	  estimated	  to	  hold	  up	  to	  four	  times	  as	  much	  in	  recoverable	  gas	  and	  oil	  deposits.	  (U.S.	  Geological	  Survey,	  2010)	  The	  amount	  of	  revenues	  that	  such	  natural	  resources,	  if	  found,	  would	   generate	   is	   anyone’s	   guess,	   as	   these	   would	   depend	   on	   highly	   unpredictable	  factors	   including	  production	  volumes,	  exploitation	  and	  transportation	  costs,	  use	  of	   the	  resources	   for	   local	   consumption	   and/or	   exports,	   the	   role	   of	   competing	   suppliers	   and	  accessible	  markets,	  and	  of	  course	  exceedingly	  volatile	  world	  energy	  prices.	  (Fattouh	  and	  El-­‐Katiri,	  2015)	  Yet	  proceeds	  would	  probably	  run	  in	  the	  billions	  of	  US	  dollars	  and	  at	  any	  rate	   be	   significant	   for	   an	   economy	   as	   small	   as	   that	   of	   Lebanon.	   In	   this	   context,	  many	  Lebanese	   have	   expressed	   highly	   pitched	   hopes	   and	   expectations	   for	   future	   economic	  prosperity	   and	   development	   in	   a	   country	   where	   political	   and	   economic	   conditions	  currently	  are	  no	  cause	  for	  celebration.	  Significant	  revenues	  extracted	  from	  producing	  oil	  and	  gas,	  or	   ‘petroleum’	  to	  denote	  both,	  could	  become	  a	  source	  of	  wealth	  and	  sustained	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economic	   growth	   if	   managed	   properly	   and	   in	   accordance	   with	   internationally	   tested	  good	  practices	  adjusted	   to	  Lebanon’s	  political	  and	   institutional	   conditions.	  However,	  a	  large	   body	   of	   literature	   and	   international	   experience	   suggests	   that	   the	   extraction	   and	  marketing	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  resources,	   in	  addition	  to	  associated	  revenue	  management	  and	  expenditure	   policies,	   are	   exposed	   to	   high	   risks	   of	   corrupt	   and	   wasteful	   governance.	  Furthermore,	  a	  windfall	  of	  natural	  resource	  rents,	  or	  even	  the	  expectation	  thereof,	  tends	  to	   encourage	   a	   scramble	   for	   resources,	   while	   (perceptions	   of)	   entrenched	   corruption	  and	  unjust	  distribution	  of	   economic	  opportunities	   and	   revenues	  may	   set	   the	   stage	   for	  new	  and/or	  reinvigorated	  intra-­‐state	  conflict.	  	  	  This	   paper	   presents	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   risks	   of	   corruption	   in	   Lebanon’s	   nascent	  governance	   structures	   established	   in	   preparation	   for	   a	   thriving	   petroleum	   sector.	   It	  draws	  primarily	  on	  unstructured	   interviews	  and	  discussions	  with	  Lebanese	  officials	   in	  relevant	   government	   institutions,	   stakeholders	   in	   the	   oil	   and	   gas	   sector,	   Lebanon’s	  business	   community	   more	   generally,	   civil	   society	   activists,	   and	   foreign	   diplomats;	   all	  involved	  or	  closely	  following	  Lebanon’s	  petroleum	  developments.2	  The	  key	  aims	  of	  this	  article	  are,	   firstly,	   to	  assess	   the	  general	   risks	  of	  corruption	   in	  connection	   to	  Lebanon’s	  emerging	  gas	  and	  oil	  sector,	  and,	  secondly,	  to	  identify	  what	  institutional	  and	  regulatory	  measures	  and	  policy	  tools	  have	  thus	  far	  been	  put	  into	  place,	  and	  to	  appraise	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  are	  sufficiently	  robust	  to	  counter	  or	  reduce	  corruption	  risks.	  As	  such,	  the	  article	  does	  not	  in	  detail	  discuss	  steps	  in	  institution	  building	  that	  Lebanon	  may	  take	  in	  the	  future	  if	  or	  when	  the	  country	  embarks	  on	  its	  journey	  down	  the	  sector’s	  value	  chain.	  While	  being	  short	  on	  concrete	  policy	  recommendations,	  the	  core	  findings	  of	  this	  article	  will	   help	   to	   inform	   a	   growing	   but	   still	   rudimentary	   debate	   in	   Lebanon	   on	   petroleum	  governance.	  In	  this	  vein,	  this	  article	  aims	  at	  presenting	  academic	  analysis	  of	  the	  risks	  of	  corruption	  in	  a	  specific	  context	  of	  (anticipated)	  natural	  resource	  endowment;	  an	  effort	  that	   all	   too	   often	   is	   left	   to	   after	   corruption	   involving	   natural	   resource	   extraction	   has	  gone	  out	  of	  control.3	  	  	  	  	  
The	  petroleum-­‐corruption	  nexus	  Numerous	  studies	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  extraction	  of	  natural	  resources	  generally,	  and	  oil	  and	  gas	  more	  specifically,	  often	  comes	  with	  heightened	  levels	  of	  corruption	  and	  malpractice	  in	  governance	  (e.g.	  Ross,	  2003;	  Marshall	  2001;	  Sachs	  &	  Warner	  1999).	  This	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literature	   developed	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   identify	   and	   understand	   the	   exact	   causal	  mechanisms	   at	   work	   in	   purported	   correlations	   between	   natural	   resource	   abundance,	  variously	  defined,	  and	  inferior	  or	  disappointing	  levels	  of	  sustained	  economic	  growth	  and	  development.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   institutions	   are	   widely	   argued	   to	   matter	   in	   that	  they	  are	  tasked	  with	  formulating	  and	  carrying	  out	  vital	  policies	  to	  counter	  or	  prevent	  a	  host	  of	  potentially	  harmful	  economic,	   financial	  and	  environmental	  effects	  of	  extraction	  and	   associated	   revenue	  windfalls.	  While	   from	   this	   perspective	   the	   need	   for	   solid	   and	  sound	  institutions	  and	  policies	  becomes	  acute	  as	  soon	  as	  natural	  resource	  rents	  arrive,	  many	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  relative	  financial	  and	  technical	  complexity	  of	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry,	   their	   state	   ownership,	   in	   combination	   with	   large	   rents	   controlled	   by	   state	  agencies	  and	  a	  host	  of	  political	  effects	  ascribed	  to	  them	  often	  tend	  to	  overwhelm	  or	  even	  undermine	   states’	   capacity	   to	   build	   and	   sustain	   such	   necessary	   institutional	   qualities	  (Papyrakis	  &	  Gerlagh,	  2004;	  McPherson	  &	  MacSearraigh	  2007).	  A	  lack	  of	  transparency,	  reduced	  levels	  of	  accountability,	  patronage	  substituting	  for	  political	  representation,	  and	  the	   temptation	   to	  waste	   rent	  windfalls	   on	  white	   elephant	   projects	   are	   in	   this	   context	  variously	   argued	   to	   cause	   systemic	   malpractices	   in	   governance	   as	   failing	   institutions	  cause	  “mother	  nature	  to	  corrupt”	  (Leite	  &	  Weidmann,	  1999).	  	  The	   suggested	   correlations	   and	   causal	  mechanisms	   involving	   the	   oil-­‐corruption	  nexus	  continue	   to	   be	   fiercely	   disputed,	   as	   are	  most	   other	   dimensions	   of	   the	   alleged	   ‘natural	  resource	   curse’	   (e.g.	   Brunnschweiler	   &	   Bulte,	   2008;	   Di	   John,	   2007;	   Ledermann	   &	  Maloney,	   2007).	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   current	   article	   three	   observations	   in	   this	  context	  will	   steer	  my	  assessment	  of	   the	   risks	   of	   corruption	   in	  Lebanon’s	   emerging	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry	  and	  related	  issues	  of	  governance.	  	  	  First,	   it	   has	   been	   commonly	   observed	   that	   it	  matters	   a	   great	   deal	   whether	   a	   country	  embarking	   on	   exploitation	   already	   has	   solid	   institutions	   in	   place	   at	   the	   time	   that	  petroleum	   is	   discovered,	   in	  which	   case	   it	   is	  more	   likely	   that	   appropriate	   institutional	  adjustments	  are	  made	  to	  counter	  or	  cushion	  the	  perilous	  effects	  of	  the	  ‘natural	  resource	  curse’	  (Frankel,	  2012;	  Smith,	  Engen	  et	  al.	  2012).	  Conversely,	  ‘green	  field’	  countries	  with	  weak	  pre-­‐existing	   institutional	   capacities	  and	  already	  alarming	   levels	  of	  pre-­‐discovery	  corruption	  are	  especially	  at	   risk	  of	   falling	   into	   the	  oil-­‐corruption	   trap.	  Even	  so,	  not	  all	  such	   countries	   entered	   a	   spiral	   of	   corruption	   when	   they	   found	   themselves	   endowed	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with	   ample	   natural	   resources.	   Indeed,	   oil	   and	   gas	   producing	   countries,	   even	   when	  relatively	   new	   to	   the	   sector,	   show	   varying	   levels	   of	   institutional	   development	   and	  associated	  corruption.	  	  	  Historical	   institutional	   antecedents	   may	   partly	   explain	   such	   variation,	   but	   these	   and	  post-­‐discovery	  institution	  building	  relevant	  to	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  sector	  do	  not	  come	  about	  in	   a	   vacuum.	   Just	   as	   institutions	   more	   generally,	   they	   are	   generated,	   shaped,	   and	  underpinned	  by	  public	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  and	  political	  struggles.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  second	  observation.	  To	  understand—and	  predict—whether,	  why,	  and	  how	  institutions	  governing	   the	  oil	   and	   gas	   sector	  will	   be	   solid	   enough	   to	  withstand	   corruption,	   or	  not,	  attention	   should	   be	   paid	   to	   what	   Khan	   (2010)	   in	   a	   more	   general	   context	   terms	   the	  ‘political	   settlement’,	   or	   the	   power	   constellations	   and	   the	   rules	   (both	   written	   and	  unwritten)	  affecting	  and	  governing	  public	  decision-­‐making	  on	  creating,	  sustaining,	  and	  reforming	  relevant	  institutions.	  	  	  Third,	   economists	   using	   large-­‐N	   studies	   and	   operating	   on	   highly	   aggregated	   levels	   of	  analysis	   involving,	   inter	  alia,	   ‘natural	   resource	  dependency’	  and	   ‘corruption’	  may	  have	  developed	  a	  strong	  nose	   for	   ‘smelling	  a	  rat’	  but	   they	  do	  not	   tell	  us	  much	  about	  where,	  exactly,	  it	  is	  hiding.	  (Kolstad	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Others	  have	  taken	  an	  approach	  that	  is	  perhaps	  more	  useful	  in	  this	  context	  as	  they	  proposed	  an	  assessment	  of	  corruption	  risks	  along	  the	  industry’s	   “value	   chain”	   as	   the	   latter	   typically	   involves	   an	   exploration	   process,	   a	  production	  process,	  and	  a	  post-­‐production	  or	  decommissioning	  phase	  (Al-­‐Kasim	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Depending	  on	   the	  robustness	  of	   regulatory	   frameworks	  and	   institutions	   tasked	  with	  upholding	  them,	  opportunities	  and	  risks	  of	  corruption	  may	  flourish	  variously	  at	  all	  stages	   in	   the	   value	   chain.	   Approaching	   the	   same	   logic	   from	   a	   policy	   perspective,	  organizations	  campaigning	  for	  good	  governance	  in	  natural	  resource	  sectors	  worldwide	  have	  pursued	  a	  similarly	  disaggregated	  approach,	  proposing	  a	  “chain	  for	  change”.	  (Alba,	  2009;	  Ross,	  2012).	  Building	  on	  this,	  one	  may	  add	  the	  dimension	  of	  revenue	  management	  and	   expenditure	   where	   opportunities	   and	   risks	   of	   corruption	   may	   equally	   arise	  depending	   on	  what	   institutions	   are	   established	   to	   channel,	   spend	   and	   save	   revenues.	  (Ross,	  2012)	  	  	  
Lebanon:	  Public	  institutions,	  corruption	  and	  political	  settlement	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Upon	  hearing	  the	  news	  in	  of	  a	  significant	  petroleum	  endowment	  likely	  hidden	  off	  their	  country’s	   coast,	   many	   Lebanese	   intuitively	   sensed	   the	   mixed	   blessing	   that	   this	   may	  bring.	   Few	   do	   not	   have	   some	   proposal	   on	   how	   to	   spend	   the	   expected	   revenues	   in	   a	  country	  that	  is	  burdened	  with	  public	  debt,	   inadequate	  basic	  infrastructure	  and	  welfare	  services,	  and	  suffering	  from	  sharp	  inequalities	  in	  terms	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  (Fadlallah,	  2012).	  Yet	  many	  commentators,	  Lebanese	  and	  foreign	  alike,	  already	  warned	  particularly	  against	   the	   risk,	   and	   for	   some	   even	   the	   inevitability,	   of	   widespread	   corruption	   in	  Lebanon’s	   emerging	   petroleum	   sector.	   (An-­‐Nahar,	   12	   April	   2011;	   Abu	   Muslih,	   2013;	  Zahi,	   2013;	   As-­‐Safir,	   8-­‐10	   October	   2015;	   ILPI,	   2013;	  World	   Bank,	   2014).	   In	   response,	  Lebanese	   politicians	   and	   officials	   have	   emphasized	   that	   corruption	   in	   the	   emerging	  governance	   of	   the	   petroleum	   sector	   will	   not	   be	   tolerated.	   Implicitly,	   relevant	   legal	  measures	   adopted	   thus	   far	   contain	   a	   similar	   pledge.	   Most	   importantly,	   the	   country’s	  Petroleum	  Activities	  Regulations	  decree	  (Decree	  10289,	  article	  162)	  explicitly	  bans	  any	  form	  of	  corruption	  or	  bribery	  in	  the	  sector,	  as	  defined	  by	  Lebanese	  law	  and	  international	  conventions.	  Furthermore,	  former	  Energy	  Minister	  Jibran	  Bassil	  indicated	  that	  Lebanon	  intends	   to	   join	   the	   Extractive	   Industries	   Transparency	   Initiative	   (EITI),	   which	   would	  compel	   the	   government	   to	   fully	   disclose	   its	   revenues	   from	   petroleum	   activities	   and	  establish	   a	   multi-­‐stakeholder	   group	   to	   oversee	   its	   commitments	   arising	   from	  membership	  (Executive	  Magazine,	  17	  October	  2013).	  	  From	  the	  author’s	  discussions	  with	  public	  officials	  specializing	   in	   the	   issue	   it	  emerged	  that	  some	  dismissed	  views	  on	  the	  risks	  of	  corruption	  in	  Lebanon’s	  emerging	  petroleum	  sector	   as	   resulting	   from	   ill	   informed	   media	   coverage	   (especially	   on	   account	   of	   the	  technicalities	  of	  the	  petroleum	  industry)4	  or	  as	  being	  excessively	  pessimistic.	  Yet	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  track	  record	  of	  public	  institution	  building	  and	  corruption	  provides	  a	  guide	  to	   a	   country’s	   future	   ability	   to	   establish	   sound	   and	   corruption-­‐free	   institutions	  governing	   an	   emerging	   petroleum	   sector—as	  many	   researchers	   on	   the	   topic	   claim—Lebanon’s	   past	   performance	   in	   this	   regard	   indeed	   constitutes	   a	   serious	   source	   of	  concern.	   Internationally	   recognized	   indices	   covering	   (perceptions	   of)	   corruption	   and	  bribery	   levels	   in	   addition	   to	   numerous	   opinion	   surveys	   consistently	   suggest	   that	  extremely	  high	   corruption	   levels	  pervade	  Lebanon’s	  political	   system,	   its	  public	   sector,	  its	  private	  sector,	  and	  society	  at	  large.	  Lebanon’s	  scores	  on	  Transparency	  International’s	  Corruption	   Perceptions	   Index	   (CPI),	   perhaps	   the	   most	   prominent	   index,	   suggest	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continuously	   dismal	   and	   even	   slightly	   worsening	   perceived	   corruption	   levels.5	  	  (Transparency	  International,	  2014	  and	  2005).	  	  	  A	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  carried	  out	  by	  social	  scientists	  and	  economists	  unanimously	  confirms	  assessments	  of	  Lebanon’s	  corruption	  problem	  and	  generally	  found	  the	  latter	  to	  be	   so	   engrained	   as	   to	   have	   become	   institutionalized	   in	   all	   matters	   of	   public	   life.	  (Leenders,	  2012	  &	  2004;	  Cammett,	  2014;	  Stel	  &	  Naudé,	  2013;	  Baumann,	  2012;	  Balanche,	  2012;	   El-­‐Husseini,	   2012;	   Gaspard,	   2004;	   Kingston,	   2013;	   and	   Picard,	   2000).	   An	  impressive	  array	  of	  ongoing	  research	  projects	  continue	  to	  explore	  Lebanon’s	  corruption	  and	   widespread	   ‘cronyism’	   at	   various	   levels,	   scrutinizing	   the	   use	   of	  wasta	   (personal	  connections	   or	   intermediaries)	   in	   transactions	   involving	   the	   public	   sector,	   conflicts	   of	  interest	  in	  fiscal	  policies	  and	  reconstruction,	   ‘cronyism’	  in	  the	  country’s	  labour	  market,	  ‘crony	   capitalism’	   and	  Lebanon’s	  banking	   sector,	   and	   corruption	   in	   rural	  development	  policy,	   urban	   development	   and	   public	   procurement.	   (Egan,	   2014;	   Mawad,	   2014;	  Makarem,	   2014;	   Chaaban,	   2014	   &	   2015;	   Diwan	   &	   Haidar,	   2015).	   None	   of	   their	   dire	  assessments	   should	   be	   uncritically	   or	   automatically	   applied	   to	   forecast	   what	   awaits	  Lebanon	   in	   terms	   of	   governing	   the	   petroleum	   sector	   and	   the	   management	   of	   its	  revenues.	  Indeed,	  some	  key	  policymakers,	  regulators,	  and	  civil	  society	  activists	  alike	  are	  adamant	   that	   with	   the	   expected	   start	   of	   petroleum	   activities	   and	   the	   arrival	   of	   their	  revenues	   Lebanon	   will	   finally	   turn	   its	   back	   to	   inadequate	   institution	   building	   and	  rampant	   corruption,	   and	   in	   this	   way	   embrace	   a	   rare	   opportunity	   and	   incentive	   for	  reform.	  (Author’s	  interviews,	  June	  2014)	  	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   technicalities	  of	   the	  petroleum	  sector	  and	   the	   institutions	  created	   to	  govern	   the	   sector	   are	   mostly	   new,	   as	   Lebanon	   has	   never	   embarked	   on	   significant	  petroleum	   production	   before.	   This,	   one	   could	   reason	   more	   optimistically,	   provides	  Lebanon	   with	   an	   opportunity	   to	   this	   time	   create	   more	   efficient	   and	   less	   corrupt	  institutions.	   Yet	   such	   individual	   qualities,	   some	   good	   intentions	   and	   relatively	  anomalous	  features	  of	  the	  petroleum	  sector	  should	  be	  understood	  against	  the	  systemic	  causes	   of	  widespread	   institutional	   failure	   and	   corruption	   in	   Lebanon	   generally,	  which	  are	   still	   far	   from	   being	   addressed.	   However,	   it	   may	   be	   persuasively	   argued	   that	   an	  analysis	   of	   a	   complex	   phenomenon	   like	   corruption	   cannot	   be	   mono-­‐causal	   and,	   by	  contrast,	  will	  need	  to	  be	  tailored	  to	  the	  specific	  sector	  and	  operations	  in	  which	  it	  occurs.	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This	   forms	   an	   additional	   reason	   to	   be	   cautious	   about	   juxtaposing	   Lebanon’s	   overall	  corruption	  record	  to	  its	  emerging	  petroleum	  sector.	  	  	  By	   comparing	   the	   trajectories	   of	   various	   Lebanese	   sectors	   and	   state	   institutions	   in	  which	   corruption	   thrived,	   one	   can	   find	   clear	   trends	   in	   that	   they	   persistently	   lacked	   a	  clear	  mandate	  governed	  by	  procedures	  and	  regulations	  with	  robust	  external	  checks	  and	  controls	  to	  ensure	  accountability,	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  separation	  of	  public	  office	  from	  private	  interests	  (Ibid.).6	  Such	  failings	  have	  given	  way	  to	  and	  became	  associated	  with	  Lebanon’s	  “allotment	   state”	   (dawlat	   al-­‐muhasasa)	   in	   which	   fierce	   struggles	   over	   the	   building	   of	  state	   institutions	   coexist	   with	   an	   utter	   disregard	   for	   the	   universal	   application	   of	  institutional	   rules	   (Ibid.)	  Muhasasa	   denotes	   a	   process	   wherein	   the	   country’s	   political	  class	   divides	   highly	   prized	   resources,	   opportunities,	   and	   privileges	   accruing	   from	   the	  state	  and	   its	  prerogatives	  among	   themselves	  and	   their	  allies	  and,	   to	  some	  extent,	   they	  pass	  it	  on	  to	  their	  (sectarian)	  constituencies	  to	  ensure	  their	  continued	  political	  support.	  	  Arguably,	   Lebanon’s	   political	   settlement,	   or	   its	   post-­‐Ta’if	   arrangement	   to	   manage	  multiple	  conflicts	  and	  generate	  decisions	  on	  institutions	  and	  policies,	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  country’s	  endemic	  failure	  to	  produce	  robust	  institutions	  able	  to	  withstand	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  characteristics	  and	  indeed	  flaws	  of	  the	  political	  settlement	  was	   that	   it	   converted	   the	  political	  and	  military	  stalemate	  of	   the	   late	  1980s	   into	  a	  new	  arrangement	   for	   public	   decision-­‐making	   that	   was	   similarly	   characterized	   by	   gridlock	  and	   fragmentation	   of	   power.7	   In	   brief,	   Lebanon’s	   political	   settlement	   significantly	  shaped	   the	   process	   of	   decision-­‐making	   and	   institution	   building	   in	   Lebanon’s	   Second	  Republic	   (Ibid.).	   Even	   when	   the	   exact	   manifestations	   and	   relative	   weight	   of	   its	   main	  features	  have	  evolved	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  change	  in	  the	  future,	  this	  political	  settlement	  by	  and	   large	   continues	   to	   constitute	   the	   context	   in	   which	   Lebanon’s	   regulatory	   and	  institutional	   framework	   for	   its	   petroleum	   sector	   has	   been	   designed,	   will	   be	   further	  developed	  and	  will	  be	  enforced.	  	  
Lebanon’s	  first	  steps	  in	  petroleum	  governance	  	  Lebanon	   already	   embarked	   on	   preparations	   for	   petroleum	   sector	   governance.	   Yet	  frustration	   has	   been	   rife	   about	   the	   country’s	   enduring	   political	   gridlock,	   change	   of	  cabinets	  and	  ministers,	  and	  since	  April	  2014	  the	  crisis	  concerning	  the	  election	  of	  a	  new	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president	  of	   the	  republic	  and	  when	  and	  how	  to	  hold	  parliamentary	  elections;	  all	   these	  political	   developments	   are	   believed	   to	   in	   one	   way	   or	   another	   hold	   back	   relevant	  policymaking	   on	   the	   petroleum	   front.	   Within	   these	   political	   constraints,	   parliament	  approved	  the	  Offshore	  Petroleum	  Resources	  Law	  in	  August	  2010	  (Law	  132,	  24	  August	  2010),	   which	   presents	   a	   general	   framework	   on	   how	   the	   sector	   should	   be	   organized,	  regulated,	  and	  governed.8	  It	  was	  followed	  in	  April	  2012	  by	  Decree	  7968	  (7	  April	  2012)	  establishing	   the	   Lebanese	   Petroleum	   Administration	   (LPA),	   whose	   members	   were	  appointed	  on	  4	  December	  2012.	  In	  February	  2013	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  approved	  the	  Petroleum	   Activities	   Regulations	   for	   Lebanon	   (Decree	   10289,	   30	   April	   2013),	   which	  provides	   general	   guidelines	   for	   commercial	   involvement	   in	   the	   sector	   and	   their	  regulation.	   Companies	  were	   invited	   in	  March	  2013	   to	   submit	   their	   credentials	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  pre-­‐qualification,	  which,	   in	   turn,	  will	  allow	  such	  companies	   to	  submit	   their	  bids	  for	  the	  envisaged	  licensing	  round.	  Out	  of	  fifty-­‐two	  applying	  companies	  from	  twenty-­‐five	  countries,	  12	  applicants	  prequalified	  as	  “operators”	  (…)	  and	  34	  companies	  as	  “non-­‐operators”	   (…).	   (Lebanese	   Republic	   (a),	   n.d.)	   Yet	   subsequently	   two	   decrees	   (one	   on	  delineating	   the	   ten	   offshore	   production	   ‘blocks’,	   the	   other	   on	   the	   model	   contract,	   or	  model	   Exploration	   and	   Production	   Agreement	   (EPA),	   continue	   to	   be	   held	   up	   in	   the	  Council	  Ministers	  for	  approval.	  	  	  
The	  Lebanese	  Petroleum	  Administration	  Law	   132	   and	  Decree	   7968	  mandate	   the	   LPA	  with	   an	   advisory	   and	   supportive	   role	   in	  preparing	   and	   applying	   the	   technical	   and	   financial	   framework	   for	   the	   country’s	  emerging	  petroleum	  sector.	  Although	  separate	   from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  Water	  Resources	  (MEWR),	  the	  LPA	  falls	  under	  the	  ministry’s	  tutelage	  and,	  indirectly,	  is	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  in	  making	  key	  decisions.	  As	  such,	  the	  LPA	  has	  some	  of	  the	   features	   of	   a	   regulatory	   body	   but,	   arguably,	   it	   lacks	   sufficient	   institutional	  independence	  that	   is	  required	  to	  perform	  its	  hefty	  tasks	  without	  political	   interference.	  The	  LPA	  differs	   in	  this	  respect	  from	  what	  was	  initially	  envisaged.	  From	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  onward	  draft	  laws	  were	  drawn	  up,	  foremost	  involving	  advisors	  at	  the	  MEWR	  assisted	  by	  experts	  sent	  by	  the	  Norwegian	  Oil	  for	  Development	  Program,	  that	  called	  for	  a	  relatively	  independent	   regulator	   for	   the	   petroleum	   sector	   by	   insulating	   it	   from	   political	  interference.	   (Author’s	   interview	  with	   Ali	   Berro,	   former	   advisor	   at	   the	  MEWR,	   6	   June	  2014	  and	  with	  foreign	  oil	  expert,	  20	  June	  2014).	  Some	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  these	  early	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efforts	   stressed	   that	   a	   fully	   independent	   regulator	   was	   not	   considered	   feasible,	   and	  perhaps	  would	  even	  be	  undesirable,	  as	  it	  would	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  simply	  being	  sidelined	  or	  marginalized	   by	   the	   political	   authorities.	   (Ibid.)	   However,	   before	   adopting	   Petroleum	  Law	  132	   in	  August	  2010	  objections	   raised	  within	   the	  Council	   of	  Ministers	   caused	   this	  envisaged	   independence,	   even	   when	   relative	   in	   nature,	   to	   be	   watered	   down	   further.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  the	  LPA	  now	  lacks	  financial	  independence	  as	  it	  is	  stipulated	  that	  its	  budget	  is	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  overall	  budget	  of	  the	  MEWR.	  	  	  The	   LPA	   board	   consists	   of	   six	   members.	   On	   the	   positive	   side,	   they	   are	   barred	   from	  having	  any	  private	  interests,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  in	  the	  contracts	  concluded	  by	  the	  LPA	  or	   in	  any	  company	  working	   in	   the	   field	   themselves	  or	  by	  being	  related	  through	  any	  of	  their	  relatives	  (up	  to	  the	  fourth	  degree).	  After	  leaving	  office	  former	  LPA	  staff	  are	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  any	  private	  sector	  activity	  pertaining	  to	  petroleum	  in	  Lebanon	  for	  at	  least	  two	  years.	   Furthermore,	   the	   presidency	   of	   the	   board	   is	   to	   rotate	   among	   the	   six	  members,	  which	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  measure	  working	  against	  potential	  abuse	  of	  power.	  Their	  high	  salaries,	  at	  least	  by	  Lebanese	  public	  service	  standards,	  also	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  mitigating	  the	  risk	  of	  bribery,	  provided	  that	  one	  subscribes	  to	  the	  disputed	  claim	  that	  susceptibility	  to	  bribery	  correlates	  with	  low	  or	  more	  modest	  salaries,	  and	  vice	  versa	  (Abbink,	  2000).9	  	  All	   LPA	   board	   members	   were	   appointed	   by	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   upon	   the	  recommendation	  of	  the	  minister	  of	  energy	  and	  water.	  In	  practice,	  this	  legally	  prescribed	  formula	   necessitated	   a	   grand	   political	   bargain	   involving	   key	   sectarian	   and	   political	  leaders	   backing	   their	   preferred	   candidates	   from	   a	   shortlist	   based	   on	   individual	  merit	  and	   experience.	   This	   pre-­‐selection	   was	   done	   by	   a	   committee	   comprising	   a	  representative	   of	   the	   Civil	   Service	   Board	   (the	   state’s	   human	   resources	   agency),	   the	  minister	   of	   state	   for	   administrative	   reform,	   the	   deputy-­‐governor	   of	   the	   central	   bank	  (acting	  for	  the	  office	  for	  the	  minister	  of	  state	  for	  administrative	  reform)	  and	  the	  minister	  of	  energy	  and	  water	  resources.	  The	  committee	  received	  more	  than	  600	  applications,	  18	  of	  which	  were	  shortlisted	  and	  presented	  to	  the	  council	  of	  ministers.	  (Author’s	  interview	  with	   MEWR	   official,	   12	   June	   2014)	   Yet	   concerns	   remain	   that	   regardless	   of	   their	  qualifications	   the	   board	   members	   will	   be	   beholden	   to	   their	   political	   backers,	   thus	  making	   them	   indirectly	   vulnerable	   to	   such	   politicians’	   possible	   conflicts	   of	   interest.	  Should	  these	  fears	  prove	  to	  be	  founded,	  the	  LPA	  board	  members	  risk	  sharing	  the	  fate	  of	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many	   other	   first	   grade	   public	   servants	   throughout	   Lebanon’s	   public	   administration	  (Leenders	  2012).	   In	  addition,	   there	  may	  be	  a	  risk	  that	  a	   lack	  of	  political	  agreement	  on	  future	  replacements	  (following	  expiration	  of	  the	  LPA	  board’s	  six	  year	  mandate	  or	  after	  individual	   dismissals	   or	   resignations)	   may	   cause	   the	   LPA	   board	   to	   sustain	   vacancies	  crippling	   the	   agency,	   as	   happened	   frequently	   since	   the	   early	   1990s	   in	   numerous	   key	  state	  agencies	  and	  ministries	  more	  generally.	  	  	  Finally,	  and	  despite	  the	  potential	  avenues	  that	  all	  these	  features	  already	  hypothetically	  offer	   in	   terms	   of	   political	   interference	   and	   influence,	   the	   LPA’s	   role	   is	   of	   a	   mainly	  advisory	  nature	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  overriding	   role	  of	   the	  minister	  of	   energy	   and	  water	  resources	  who,	  in	  turn,	  is	  to	  obtain	  the	  endorsement	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  for	  his	  policies	  and	  decisions.	  In	  short,	  within	  this	  institutional	  setup,	  and	  despite	  the	  rigorous	  process	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	   appointment	   of	   capable	   individuals,	   the	   LPA	   runs	   a	  significant	   risk	   of	   becoming	   subjected	   to	   political	   pressures	   and	   influence.	   This	  vulnerability	  is	  underscored	  by	  the	  power	  of	  the	  minister	  of	  energy	  and	  water	  resources	  to	   present	   –	   or	   threaten	   to	   present-­‐-­‐	   LPA	   staff	   to	   the	   state’s	   disciplinary	   board	   for	  alleged	   violations	   of	   the	   law	   and	   neglect	   of	   duty,	   thereby	   giving	   the	  minister,	   at	   least	  hypothetically,	  a	  powerful	  tool	  to	  press	  or	  deter	  dissenting	  staff	  into	  compliance.	  	  Officials	  at	  the	  MEWR	  counter	  that,	  even	  if	  the	  LPA	  is	  not	  fully	  independent,	   it	  still	  has	  important	   leverage	   in	   the	   power	   structure	   involving	   the	   MEWR	   and	   the	   Council	   of	  Ministers.	  (Author’s	  interview,	  20	  June	  2014)	  They	  point	  out	  that	  the	  minister	  of	  energy	  and	  water	   resources	   cannot	   easily	   diverge	   from	   the	   LPA’s	   recommendations	   when	   it	  comes	  to	  key	  policies	  or	  measures	  in	  the	  petroleum	  sector,	  just	  as	  the	  minister	  will	  have	  to	  explain	   its	  position	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	   if	  he	  does.	  Yet	   it	   is	  doubtful	   that	   this	  will	   be	   sufficient,	   as	   it	   does	   not	   shield	   the	   LPA	   from	   possible	   pressures	   from	   or	  overriding	   powers	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers,	   with	   or	   without	   collusion	   with	   the	  minister	  of	  energy	  and	  water	  resources.	  	  	  	  In	   the	   event	   that	   the	   LPA	   would	   succumb	   to	   political	   pressure	   and	   associated	  malpractices	   in	   regulating	   and	   governing	   the	   petroleum	   sector,	   chances	   are	   that	  with	  current	   auditing	   mechanisms	   and	   their	   administrative	   capacities	   this	   may	   not	   be	  properly	   detected.	   External	   auditing	   of	   the	   LPA’s	   activities	   is	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   a	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posteriori	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Accounts	  (CA),	  the	  state’s	  financial	  watchdog	  (Law	  132,	  Article	  10).	  Unless	   this	  agency	   is	   to	  be	  dramatically	   revamped	  and	  strengthened—a	  necessity	  underscored	  repeatedly	  since	   the	  early	  1990s	  but	  never	  seriously	   followed	  up—it	  will	  not	   be	   able	   to	   carry	   out	   this	   task	   adequately.	   The	   CA	   currently	   has	   no	   expertise	   on	  matters	  related	  to	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  sector	  and,	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  to	  date,	   it	   failed	  to	  meaningfully	  monitor	   the	  MEWR’s	   operations	   in	   Lebanon’s	   unruly	   petroleum	   imports	  sector.	   Its	   senior	   staff	   and	   auditors	   lost	   immunity	   since	   1970s	   from	   dismissal	   by	   the	  president	   of	   the	   republic	   and,	   under	   the	   stipulations	   agreed	   to	   in	  Ta’if,	   the	   Council	   of	  Ministers.	  The	  CA	  has	  consistently	  suffered	  from	  personnel	  shortages,	  political	  bickering	  over	   key	   staff	   appointments,	   political	   interference,	   and	   from	   political	   maneuvers	   to	  suppress	   the	   few	   incriminating	   reports	   that	  under	   these	  conditions	   it	  was	   still	   able	   to	  produce	  (Leenders,	  2012;	  As-­‐Safir,	  10	  July	  2012).	  These	  obstacles	  undermined	  the	  CA’s	  operations	   dramatically,	   thereby	   earning	   it	   a	   reputation	   of	   being	   overly	   legalistic	   and	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  state’s	  responsibilities.	  	  
The	  prequalification	  round	  It	   is	  of	   course	   too	  early	   to	   say	  whether	  or	  how	   the	  LPA’s	   institutional	   framework	  will	  affect	  its	  staff’s	  professionalism	  or	  integrity	  in	  practice.	  For	  now,	  stakeholders	  including	  the	   international	   oil	   companies	   (IOCs)	   say	   they	   are	   impressed	   by	   the	   efficiency	   and	  transparency	  by	  which	   the	  LPA	  has	  approached	   the	  pre-­‐qualification	   round,	   the	  LPA’s	  first	   major	   accomplishment.	   (Author’s	   interviews	   with	   IOC	   officials,	   May-­‐June	   2014)	  Others,	   including	   Lebanese	   journalists	   working	   on	   petroleum	   issues,	   expressed	  satisfaction	   with	   the	   LPA’s	   efforts	   to	   explain	   its	   policies	   and	   operations,	   and	   answer	  their	   questions,	   at	   first	   without	   attribution	   and,	  more	   recently,	   by	   giving	   high-­‐profile	  media	  interviews	  (Hoteit	  2014,	  author’s	  interviews	  with	  Lebanese	  journalists,	  May-­‐June	  2014).	  From	  this	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  regulation	  compelling	  the	  LPA	  to	  first	  obtain	  the	  prior	  consent	  of	  the	  minister	  of	  energy	  and	  water	  resources	  before	  making	  public	  statements	  (Decree	  7968,	  article	  5)	  is	  liberally	  applied	  in	  favor	  of	  transparency	  and	  outreach	  to	  the	  public,	  although	  the	  latter	  would	  be	  better	  realized	  if	  this	  stipulation	  would	  be	  removed.	  	  Yet	   in	   terms	   of	   transparency	   and	   accountability,	   there	   remain	   a	   number	   of	   concerns	  about	   the	   pre-­‐qualification	   round.	   According	   to	   Decree	   9882	   (13	   February	   2013),	  successful	  companies	  need	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  strict	  set	  of	   legal,	   financial,	   technical,	  and	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environmental	   criteria	  designed	   to	  enable	   the	  LPA	   to	   identify	   serious	   contenders	  who	  possess	   relevant	   experience	   in	   the	   technically	   demanding	   business	   of	   deep-­‐water	  offshore	  petroleum	  extraction	  and	  who	  have	  sufficient	   financial	   clout	   to	  carry	  out	  and	  sustain	  their	  tasks.	  (Republic	  of	  Lebanon,	  15	  February	  2013)	  In	  this	  context	  a	  distinction	  is	  made	  between	  “operating	  companies”	  and	  “non-­‐operating	  companies”,	  which	  need	  to	  meet	   different	   criteria,	   and	  which,	   after	   being	  pre-­‐qualified,	  will	   be	   invited	   to	   present	  their	   joint	   bids	   for	   an	  EPA	   as	   a	   consortium	   comprising	   at	   least	   one	   operator	   and	   two	  non-­‐operating	   companies.	   After	   assessing	   the	   applications,	   the	   MEWR	   and	   the	   LPA	  announced	  on	  18	  April	  2013	  that	  twelve	  companies	  had	  pre-­‐qualified	  as	  operators	  and	  thirty-­‐four	  as	  non-­‐operators.	  The	  large	  number	  of	  contenders	  promises	  to	  encourage	  a	  highly	  competitive	  bidding	  process,	  which	  from	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	  perspective	  could	  be	  viewed	   as	   placing	   some	   checks	   on	   unfair	   practices	   such	   as	   granting	   contracts	   against	  suboptimal	   terms.	  Crucially,	   however,	  no	   sufficient	  documentation	  or	   explanation	  was	  provided	  about	  why	  and	  how	  the	  companies	  had	  been	  found	  to	  meet	  the	  criteria	  of	  pre-­‐qualification.	  (Lebanese	  Republic	  (b),	  n.d.)	  Sources	  at	  the	  MEWR	  told	  the	  author	  that	  it	  refrained	  from	  publishing	  such	  information	  after	  receiving	  requests	  from	  the	  companies	  to	  maintain	   confidentiality,	   especially	  when	   it	   was	   suggested	   to	   release	   data	   on	   their	  total	  capital.	  (Author’s	  interview	  at	  the	  MEWR,	  6	  June	  2014)	  	  Importantly,	   for	   the	   main	   prequalified	   operators	   such	   sub-­‐optimal	   disclosure	   in	   this	  respect	   raises	   no	   immediate	   questions.	   After	   all,	   the	   twelve	   large	   companies	   that	  prequalified	   are	   all	   internationally	   and	   publicly	   renowned	   for	   having	   many	   years	   of	  relevant	  experience	   in	  off	  shore	  petroleum	  extraction.	  Also,	  as	  all	   these	  companies	  are	  listed	   on	   U.S.	   and/or	   European	   stock	   exchanges,	   especially	   since	   the	   U.S.	   Congress	  passed	   the	   Dodd-­‐Frank	   Act	   in	   2010	   and	   the	   EU	   tightened	   similar	   legislation	   they	   are	  obliged	  to	  disclose	  their	  capital	  and	  assets	  just	  as	  they	  are	  normally	  keen	  to	  inform	  their	  shareholders	  about	  their	  activities.	  Yet	  such	  is	  far	  less	  evident	  for	  the	  pre-­‐qualified	  non-­‐operating	  companies.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  that	  unfair	  or	  shady	  practices	  did	  in	  fact	  occur.	  Yet	  a	  key	  concern	  in	  this	  context	  remains	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Lebanese	  businessmen,	  in	  possible	  or	  perhaps	  even	   likely	  partnerships	  with	  political	   leaders,	  may	  gain	  access	   to	  the	  large	  rents	  associated	  with	  upstream	  activities	  by	  the	  winning	  consortiums.	  Sources	  at	   the	   MEWR	   objected	   in	   this	   context	   that	   such	   a	   degree	   of	   confidentiality	   is	   not	  uncommon	   in	  prequalification	  processes	  worldwide.	   (Ibid.)	  Perhaps	   so,	   but	  Lebanon’s	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dismal	   record	   of	   corruption	   and	   its	   endemic	   blurring	   of	   public	   and	   private	   interests	  arguably	  calls	  for	  extra	  caution	  and	  full	  transparency.	  	  	  In	  terms	  of	  transparency,	  the	  above	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  lost	  opportunity	  even	  if	  or	  when	  such	  can	  be	  largely	  explained	  by	  companies’	  insistence	  on	  confidentiality.	  Arguably,	  the	  incomplete	  transparency	  caused	  by	  not	  disclosing	  how	  and	  why	  prequalified	  companies	  met	  the	  criteria,	  and	  by	  not	  identifying	  their	  owners,	  was	  compounded	  by	  a	  stipulation	  in	   Decree	   9882	   (article	   3).	   The	   latter	   allows	   non-­‐operators	   to	   partner	   with	   other	  companies	  in	  their	  applications	  for	  prequalification	  as	  long	  as	  at	  least	  the	  main	  applicant	  (and	  not	  necessarily	   its	  partners)	   can	  prove	   that	   it	  meets	   the	  prequalification	  criteria,	  including	  having	  relevant	  experience	  in	  the	  sector	  and	  possessing	  at	  least	  $500	  million	  in	  total	  assets.	  One	  Lebanese	  lawyer	  specializing	  in	  the	  petroleum	  sector	  argued	  in	  this	  context	  that	  this	  stipulation	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  sitting	  uneasily	  with	  the	  general	  principle	  set	   out	   in	   Law	   132,	   and	   explicitly	   mentioned	   in	   Decree	   9882,	   that	   only	   capable	   and	  experienced	   companies	  may	   take	   part	   in	   petroleum	   extraction.	   (Author’s	   interview,	   2	  June	  2014.)	  After	  all,	  now	  companies	  with	  no	  relevant	  experience	  whatsoever	  may	  join	  the	   consortiums	   by	   partnering	  with	   an	   established	   company	   in	   the	   sector	   and	   jointly	  prequalify.	  Sources	  within	  the	  MEWR	  explained	  that	  the	  council	  of	  ministers	  had	  added	  this	   option	   to	   an	   earlier	   draft	   of	   the	  pre-­‐qualification	  decree,	   prepared	  by	   the	   LPA,	   in	  order	  to	  allow	  for	  Lebanese	  participation	  in	  the	  consortiums	  and	  promote	  the	  country’s	  private	  sector.	  (Author’s	  interview,	  6	  June	  2014)	  They	  stressed	  that	  the	  main	  company	  that	  decides	  to	  partner	  with	  other	  companies	  retains	  full	  legal	  responsibility	  and	  liability	  in	  any	  joint	  application	  for	  prequalification,	  and	  that	  as	  such	  the	  provision	  contains	  no	  risks.	  	  Yet	   if	   (Lebanese)	   companies	   lacking	   relevant	   experience	   in	   petroleum	   may	   still	   be	  viewed	  as	  desirable	  partners	   to	  other	  (foreign)	  companies	   that	  do	  meet	   these	  criteria,	  why	   would	   fully	   skilled	   and	   solvent	   foreign	   petroleum	   companies	   want	   to	   associate	  themselves	  with	  (Lebanese)	  companies	  that	  cannot	  or	  do	  not	  necessarily	  demonstrate	  a	  relevant	   track	   record?	   It	   is	   quite	   conceivable	   that	   foreign	   companies	  wish	   to	   partner	  with	   Lebanese	   partners	   in	   order	   to	   be	   better	   placed,	   for	   example,	   to	  meet	   the	   legally	  prescribed	   criterion	   to	   employ	   at	   least	   80	   percent	   Lebanese	   citizens	   among	   its	  workforce	   or	   to	   better	   navigate	   the	   country’s	   institutional	   and	   economic	   landscape	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generally	   by	   virtue	   of	   incorporating	   local	   knowledge	   and	   expertise.	   Yet	   another	  conjectural	  suggestion,	  and	  therefore	  risk,	  may	  be	  that	  companies	  this	  way	  prepare	  the	  ground	  for	  gaining	  wasta,	  or	  influence	  peddling	  judged	  beneficial	  or	  necessary	  in	  future	  dealings	  with	  the	  Lebanese	  authorities.	  	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  ample	  alternatives	  for	  foreign	  non-­‐operating	  companies	  to	  allow	  for	  or	  encourage	  direct	  or	   indirect	  Lebanese	  participation,	   for	  example	  by	  selling	  stock	  or	  by	   establishing	   credit	   relationships	   with	   Lebanese	   banks.	   None	   of	   this	   is	   necessarily	  illegal	   or	   even	   circumspect.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   there	   are	   some	   good	   economic	   and	  practical	   reasons	   to	   encourage	   Lebanese	   participation.	   Yet	   in	   Lebanon’s	   climate	   of	  fundamental	  distrust	  involving	  the	  relationship	  between	  business	  and	  politics,	  the	  above	  also	  points	  up	   to	   the	   imperative	   that	  any	   future	  access	  by	   (Lebanese)	  businessmen	   to	  the	  consortiums’	   sizeable	  royalties	  and	  shares	  of	  oil	   revenues	  should	  at	   least	  be	  made	  fully	  transparent	  and	  known	  to	  the	  public.	  Despite	  efforts	  to	  make	  the	  pre-­‐qualification	  process	  as	  transparent	  as	  possible,	  this	  requirement	  is	  still	  to	  be	  met.	  	  	  
Toward	  tendering	  for	  the	  exploration	  and	  production	  agreements	  Concerns	  about	  the	  transparency	  of	  the	  prequalification	  process	  may	  become	  critical	  in	  the	   process	   of	   bidding	   for	   and	   signing	   EPAs	   and	   in	   the	   context	   of	   their	   envisaged	  confidentiality.	  Sources	  within	  the	  MEWR	  say	  that	  the	  “model	  contract”	  will	  be	  disclosed	  as	   it	   will	   be	   subject	   to	   a	   decree	   that	   is	   currently	   under	   examination	   by	   a	  ministerial	  committee.	  (Author’s	  interviews,	  30	  May	  and	  6	  June	  2014.)	  In	  their	  view,	  this	  will	  make	  it	  unnecessary	  to	  disclose	  the	  actual	  EPAs	  concluded	  with	  the	  bidding	  consortium(s)	  as	  the	   final	   contracts	  will	  not	   significantly	  differ	   from	   the	  model	  EPA.	   In	   this	   context	   the	  difference	   between	   production-­‐sharing	   contracts	   and	   the	   main	   alternative,	   that	   of	  licensing,	   is	   of	   importance.	   While	   in	   the	   latter	   all	   financial	   stipulations—such	   as	  royalties,	   taxes	   and	   ‘profit	   oil’	   and	   ‘cost	   oil’	   (see	   below)—are	   set	   by	   law,	   production-­‐sharing	   contracts	   contain	   certain	   ‘biddable	   items’,	   i.e.	   agreements	   on	   ways	   to	   share	  petroleum	   proceeds.	   For	   reasons	   of	   transparency,	   the	   licensing	   system	   is	   generally	  preferred	   (if	   certainly	  not	   always	  practiced,	  not	   even	   in	   countries	   subscribing	   to	   ‘best	  practices’),	   primarily	   because	   all	   financial	   or	   fiscal	   agreements	  will	   this	  way	   be	  made	  public	  and	  be	  more	  difficult	   to	  change	  by	  way	  of	  negotiation.	   (Author’s	   interview	  with	  international	   diplomat	   specialized	   in	   petroleum	   finance,	   9	   June	   2014)	   If	   kept	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undisclosed,	  production-­‐sharing	  contracts	  will	  cause	  agreements	  on	  such	  crucial	  issues	  to	  remain	  unknown	  to	  the	  public.	  Lebanon	  has	  opted	  for	  a	  hybrid	  system	  whereby	  some	  fiscal	  items	  are	  set	  by	  law	  (taxes	  and	  royalties	  to	  the	  state)	  but	  others	  (including	  ‘costs	  oil’	  to	  reimburse	  the	  right	  holders,	  and	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  remaining	  oil	  split	  between	  the	   state	   and	   the	   producer)	   are	   left	   to	   be	   determined	   in	   the	   final	   EPAs;	   so-­‐called	  ‘biddable	  items’.	  (LPA,	  n.d.)	  For	  now	  there	  are	  no	  legal	  obligations	  for	  the	  EPA	  contracts	  to	  be	  made	  public,	  although	  former	  Energy	  Minister	  Jibran	  Bassil	  made	  a	  promise	  to	  this	  effect	   (Executive,	   17	   October	   2013).	   Sources	   within	   the	   MEWR	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   the	  companies	  who	   are	   insisting	   on	   confidentiality,	   as	   the	   contracts	  will	   contain	   sensitive	  geological	   and	   production	   data	   that	   will	   be	   of	   great	   interest	   to	   their	   competitors.	  (Author’s	  interviews,	  30	  May	  and	  6	  June	  2014.)	  This,	  however,	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  for	  the	  Lebanese	  authorities	  to	  not	  at	  least	  release	  the	  fiscal	  details	  in	  the	  EPAs	  or	  to	  redact	  the	  latter	   to	   the	   same	   effect	   (PWYP,	   2012).	   If	   this	   does	   not	   happen,	   financial	   disclosure	  requirements	   of	   international	   oil	   companies	   falling	   under	   U.S.	   and	   European	  jurisdictions	  will	   only	   be	   partially	   helpful	   in	   extrapolating	  what	   the	   fiscal	   agreements	  within	   the	   EPAs	   may	   have	   looked	   like.	   For	   now,	   international	   oil	   companies	   are	   not	  obliged	  to	  disclose	  the	  contracts	  they	  sign;	  neither	  would	  the	  Lebanese	  government	  be	  under	  current	  legislation,	  and	  not	  even	  if	  it	  were	  to	  join	  the	  EITI.	  	  The	  need	  for	  disclosure	  of	  Lebanon’s	  EPA	  contracts	  and	  its	  fiscal	  details,	   in	  addition	  to	  full	  transparency	  on	  the	  ownership	  of	  all	  right	  holders	  in	  the	  extraction	  of	  petroleum	  has	  only	  become	  more	  pertinent	   in	   the	  Lebanese	   context	   of	   continuous	  political	   bickering	  over	  the	  two	  ‘missing	  decrees’	  that	  still	  need	  to	  be	  adopted	  before	  tendering	  can	  start.	  In	  the	   Lebanese	   media	   and	   in	   conversations	   with	   the	   author,	   the	   disagreements	   in	   this	  respect	  have	  been	  explained	   in	   reference	   to	   the	  preference	  of	   former	  Energy	  Minister	  Jibran	  Bassil	  to	  auction	  only	  a	  few	  specific	  blocks	  out	  of	  ten	  delineated	  while	  Speaker	  of	  Parliament	  Nabih	  Berri	  purportedly	  prefers	  to	  open	  all	  of	  them	  at	  once	  to	  receive	  bids.	  The	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  both	  proposals	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  article	  but	  are	  framed	  as	   different	   strategies	   to	   gain	  maximum	   leverage	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   oil	   companies	   or	   kick	   start	  extraction	   at	   maximum	   levels.	   However,	   it	   is	   questionable	   whether	   such	   technical	  details	   of	   substance	   really	   constitute	   the	   core	  of	   the	  disagreement.	   Indeed,	  Berri	   does	  not	  seem	  to	  argue	  that	  all	  blocks	  opened	  for	  bidding	  will	  in	  fact	  need	  to	  be	  awarded	  to	  companies.	   (Author’s	   interview	  with	  MEWR	   official,	   6	   June	   2014)	   This	   has	   prompted	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speculation	  that	  Lebanon’s	  political	  leaders	  are	  resorting	  to	  their	  engrained	  practice	  of	  
muhasasa	   and	   that	   their	   quarrels	   are,	   in	   fact,	   about	   dividing	   up	   the	   revenues	   and/or	  business	  opportunities	  associated	  with	  the	  emerging	  petroleum	  at	  large.	  (As-­‐Safir,	  8-­‐10	  October	  2015)	  	  	  	  
Upstream	  subcontracting	  When	   or	   if	   the	   EPAs	  will	   have	   been	   signed	   and	   the	   consortiums	  will	   start	   operating,	  large	  scale	  subcontracting	  is	  expected	  to	  take	  place	  to	  service	  and	  supply	  the	  operators,	  primarily	  onshore.	  Such	  upstream	  activities	  will	  range	  from	  hiring	  security	  companies,	  supplying	   equipment,	   and	   purchasing	   or	   leasing	   land	   for	   petroleum	   installations,	   to	  building	   and	   servicing	   them.	   Operators	   are	   in	   this	   context	   legally	   obliged	   to	   give	  “preferential	  treatment	  to	  the	  procurement	  of	  Lebanese	  originating	  goods	  and	  services	  when	   such	   goods	   and	   services	   are	   internationally	   competitive	  with	   regard	   to	   quality,	  availability,	   price,	   and	   performance.”	   (Decree	   10289,	   article	   157)	   Undoubtedly,	   this	  obligation	  is	  aimed	  at	  giving	  Lebanese	  private	  sector	  companies	  a	  much-­‐needed	  boost.	  Accordingly,	   scores	   of	   Lebanese	   companies	   are	   already	   preparing	   themselves	   for	   the	  petroleum	  industry.	  Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  has	  been	  rightly	  noted	  that	  in	  the	  Lebanese	  context,	  and	  indeed	  perhaps	  generally,	  the	  risks	  of	  corruption	  and	  clientelist	  practices	  in	  subcontracting	  will	  be	  significant.	  (Author’s	  interviews	  with	  Lebanese	  businessmen	  and	  at	   the	  Beirut	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	   June	  2014;	  CDL,	   June	  2014).	  Lebanese	  petroleum	  officials	  seem	  to	  expect	  that	  the	  operators	  will	  be	  largely	  self-­‐regulating	  in	  this	  respect	  as	  the	  latter	  are	  assumed	  to	  pursue	  efficiency	  targets	  that	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  favouritism	  and	  corruption,	  and	  because	  as	  a	  consortium	  its	  members	  will	  keep	  each	  other	  in	  check.	  (Author’s	  interviews	  with	  MEWR	  officials,	  6	  and	  12	  June	  2014)	  In	  congruence	  with	  this,	  sources	  within	  Western	  major	  oil	  companies	  that	  prequalified	  confirm	  their	  strong	  and	  self-­‐interested	   intention	   to	   refrain	   from	   unfair	   practices	   and	   bribery,	   fearing	   costly	  corruption	   cascades.	   (Author’s	   interviews,	   May	   2014)	   It	   is	   perhaps	   against	   this	  background	   that	   the	   regulations	   or	   mechanisms	   being	   put	   in	   place	   or	   envisaged	   to	  mitigate	   the	  risks	  of	   corruption	   in	  upstream	  subcontracting	  do	  not	   include	  unusual	  or	  overly	   drastic	  measures	   or	   place	   stringent	   disclosure	   obligations	   on	   the	   consortiums.	  The	   operators	   are	   expected	   to	   subject	   “major	   procurement	   contracts”	   to	   public	  tendering,	  to	  submit	  a	  list	  of	  prequalified	  bidders	  to	  the	  LPA,	  justify	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  supplier,	   and	   let	   themselves	   being	   scrutinized	   by	   an	   external	   auditor	   (Decree	   10289,	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article	  157).	  As	  such,	  these	  requirements	  certainly	  meet	  international	  best	  practices	  and	  the	  Lebanese	  authorities	  should	  be	  lauded	  for	  adopting	  them.	  	  	  Yet,	  even	  when	  strictly	  enforced,	  such	  legal	  measures	  will	  still	  not	  necessarily	  result	  in	  reduced	  levels	  of	  corruption	  or	  cronyism.	  Ironically,	  one	  could	  argue	  in	  this	  context	  that	  Lebanon’s	   general	   conditions	   of	   heightened	   corruption	   risks	   call	   for	   more	   drastic	  measures	  than	  called	  for	  by	  best	  international	  practice.	  For	  one,	  the	  Lebanese	  market	  is	  characterized	   by	   strong	   monopolistic	   and	   oligopolistic	   tendencies,	   particularly	   in	   the	  petroleum	   imports	   and	   distribution	   sector	   that	   is	   likely	   to	   sweep	   up	   many	  subcontracting	   opportunities	   (Traboulsi,	   2014;	   Leenders,	   2012).	   Sources	   within	   the	  MEWR	  understandably	  argue	  that	  they	  “are	  not	  into	  the	  business	  of	  market	  regulation”,	  at	  least	  not	  across	  all	  sectors.	  (Author’s	  interview,	  6	  June	  2014)	  But,	  for	  now,	  neither	  is	  any	  other	  Lebanese	  public	  agency	  as	  attempts	  to	  adopt	  and	  effectively	  implement	  anti-­‐trust	  legislation	  have	  thus	  far	  been	  unsuccessful.	  In	  combination	  with	  Lebanon’s	  blurred	  boundaries	   between	   business	   ownership	   and	   politics,	   this	   forms	   a	   source	   of	  apprehension	   as	   far	   as	   petroleum	   subcontracting	   is	   concerned.	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	   not	  fully	  clear	  from	  existing	  legislation	  on	  the	  emerging	  petroleum	  sector	  to	  what	  extent	  and	  how	   exactly	   the	   LPA	   will	   monitor	   and	   screen	   the	   subcontracting	   process,	   and	   what	  powers	   it	  would	   have	   if	   any	   irregularities	  were	   to	   be	   detected.	   The	   less	   than	   optimal	  degree	   of	   the	   LPA’s	   political	   insulation	   generally	   adds	   to	   the	   risk	   that	   even	   when	   it	  intends	   to	   be	   pro-­‐active	   in	   this	   field	   it	   may	   ultimately	   not	   be	   fully	   successful	   to	  effectively	   counter	   corruption	   in	   upstream	   subcontracting.	   Under	   existing	   legislation,	  public	   oversight	   or	   scrutiny	   in	   this	   respect,	   by	   media	   and/or	   civil	   society,	   does	   not	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  the	  cards	  as	  neither	  operators	  or	  the	  authorities	  seem	  to	  be	  under	  any	  obligation	   to	   publicly	   disclose	   information	   on	   tendering,	   let	   alone	   disclose	   ownership	  details	  of	  winning	  companies.	  Indeed,	  such	  details	  may	  not	  be	  released	  due	  to	  possible	  confidentiality	  clauses	  in	  the	  EPAs	  covering	  the	  formalities	  of	  subcontracting.	  	  	  When	   offshore	   subcontracting	  will	   provide	   lucrative	   business	   opportunities,	   risks	   are	  that	  it	  may	  be	  subjected	  to	  pressures	  of	  muhasasa.	  It	  is	  possibly	  the	  anticipation	  thereof	  that	   currently	   constitutes	   one	   factor	   in	   holding	   back	   political	   agreement	   on	   the	   two	  missing	  decrees.	  Depending	  on	  the	  blocks	   that	  will	  be	  put	  up	   for	  auction	  and	  will	   first	  start	  production,	  onshore	  locations	  that	  are	  closest	  to	  the	  terminals	  are	  likely	  to	  witness	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a	   boom	   in	   construction,	   services	   and	   business	   generally.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   drawing	  analogies	   provides	   any	   guidance,	   Lebanon’s	  wartime	   control	   over	   several	   clandestine	  ports	  by	  sectarian	  militias	  and	  illegal	  seaside	  properties	  held	  by	  major	  politicians	  since,	  there	   is	   a	   risk	   that	   such	   onshore	   locations	   may	   be	   viewed	   as	   political-­‐confessional	  fiefdoms	   (Leenders,	   2012;	   Al-­‐Akhbar,	   10	   December	   2012).	   That,	   in	   turn,	   could	   place	  serious	  political	  and	  confessional	  constraints	  on	  competitive	  bidding	  and	  fair	  practices	  in	  operators’	  upstream	  subcontracting.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   consequences	   of	   possible	   corruption,	   market	   concentration,	   and/or	   politically	  induced	   inefficiencies	   in	   subcontracting	   arrangements	   cannot	   be	   discounted	   in	   the	  context	   of	   the	   ‘cost	   oil’	   arrangement	   foreseen	   in	   the	   EPAs.	   (Decree	   10289,	   article	   72)	  This	   allows	   the	   operators	   to	   be	   reimbursed	   for	   their	   “recoverable	   costs”	   in	   kind.	   As	  explained	   above,	   this	   constitutes	   a	   ‘biddable	   item’	   and,	   hence,	   if	   the	   EPAs	   are	   not	  disclosed,	  it	  may	  never	  become	  known	  to	  the	  public	  what	  exact	  arrangements	  were	  put	  in	  place.	  Equally,	  and	  if	  not	  strictly	  monitored,	  regulated,	  seriously	  capped	  and	  publicly	  disclosed,	   the	   ‘cost	  oil’	   provision	  may	  challenge	   the	  overall	   assumption	   that	  operators	  will	   be	   driven	   by	   efficiency	   concerns	   in	   their	   subcontracting.	   IOCs	   and	   their	   non-­‐operating	  partners	  may	  ideally	  seek	  maximum	  efficiency	  and	  cost	  savings,	  but	  the	  need	  to	   overcome	   political	   constraints	   and	   boost	   expediency	  may	   at	   times	   rival	   such	   basic	  incentives.	   Indeed,	   experiences	   elsewhere,	   including	   in	   India,	   suggest	   that	   operators	  may	  at	  times	  fail	  to	  show	  self-­‐restraint	  when	  their	  subcontracting	  is	  not	  bound	  to	  very	  strict	   rules,	   oversight,	   and	   limitations,	   both	   by	   hosting	   authorities	   and	   the	   public	   at	  large.	  (Achong,	  2009/2010;	  Livemint	  &	  The	  Wall	  Street	   Journal,	  9	  September	  2011)	  In	  short,	   market	   concentration,	   favoritism,	   corruption,	   and	   measures	   that	   fall	   short	   of	  drastically	  regulating,	  policing,	  and	  disclosing	   ‘cost	  oil’	  provisions	  will	  constitute	  a	  risk	  of	   Lebanon’s	   petroleum	   revenues	   being	   skimmed	   even	   before	   they	   reach	   the	   state’s	  treasury.	  	  	  
Establishing	  a	  national	  oil	  company	  Law	  132	  (article	  6	  -­‐1)	  stipulates	  that	  “when	  necessary	  and	  after	  promising	  commercial	  opportunities	  have	  been	  verified,	   the	  Council	   of	  Ministers	  may	  establish	   a	  national	   oil	  company	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   proposal	   by	   the	   minister	   based	   upon	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	  petroleum	   administration.”	   Accordingly,	   a	   future	   option	   was	   created	   for	   an	   NOC	   to	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operate	   on	   the	   production	   side	   of	   the	   petroleum	   sector.	   Yet	   the	   legally	   enshrined	  requirement	  of	  such	  an	  NOC’s	  commercial	  viability	  and	   the	  explicit	  need	   for	   the	  LPA’s	  endorsement	  appears	   to	  be	  as	  much	  designed	  to	  prevent	   its	   immediate	  establishment.	  (Author’s	   interview	   with	   MEWR	   official,	   20	   June	   2014)	   Regardless,	   the	   idea	   already	  prompted	  some	  controversy	  as	  some	  Lebanese	  observers	  suspect	  that	  the	  running	  of	  a	  Lebanese	  NOC	  will	  be	  riddled	  with	  corruption	  and	  struck	  by	   inefficiencies,	  akin	   to	   the	  unhappy	   experience	   with	   Electricité	   du	   Liban	   (Takieddine,	   2013;	   ILPI,	   2013;	   Sarkis,	  2014;	  Uherova-­‐Hasbani,	  2011).	  They	  also	  point	  out	  that	  NOCs	  worldwide,	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  have	  often	  been	  prone	  to	  corruption.	  Lebanese	  common	  skepticism	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   an	   assertive	   role	   of	   the	   state,	   and	   ‘statism’	   more	   generally,	   is	   echoed	   by	  International	   Financial	   Institutions	   and	   some	   IOCs	   who	   have	   their	   own	   reasons	   to	  counter	   the	   worldwide	   trend	   toward	   establishing	   NOCs	   and	   “resource	   nationalism”	  (Ross,	   2012).	   Yet	   analogies	  with	   seemingly	   similar	   and	   corruption-­‐ridden	   institutions,	  within	  Lebanon	  or	  in	  other	  petroleum	  producing	  countries,	  can	  be	  as	  helpful	  as	  they	  are	  deceptive.	   With	   the	   creation	   of	   any	   new	   state	   institution	   vested	   interests	   and	   long-­‐established	  expectations	  of	  entitlement	  will	  be	  less	  engrained.	  This	  does	  not	  remove	  the	  risks	  of	  corruption	  but	  it	  does	  offer	  new	  opportunities	  to	  break	  with	  ‘business	  as	  usual’.	  In	  the	  longer	  term,	  an	  NOC	  is	  likely	  to	  promote	  Lebanon’s	  high-­‐end	  human	  capital	  to	  be	  employed	  in	  the	  sector	  while	   it	  will	  allow	  for	  higher	  returns	  on	  petroleum	  production.	  While	  aiming	  for	  these	  goals,	  a	  Lebanese	  NOC	  could	  cooperate,	  partner	  with,	  and	  learn	  from	   IOCs	   that	   have	   both	   the	   capital	   and	   expertise	   to	   spearhead	   offshore	   petroleum	  activities.	   From	   a	   perspective	   of	   corruption	   control,	   the	   NOC’s	   initial	   and	   inevitable	  dependency	  on	  the	  IOCs,	  possibly	  by	  way	  of	  taking	  part	  in	  a	  consortium,	  would	  generate	  some	  important	  checks	  and	  balances	  on	  the	  Lebanese	  NOC	  as	  its	  partners	  are	  unlikely	  to	  tolerate	  systemic	  and	  loss-­‐making	  mediocrity,	  corruption,	  and	  cronyism.	  	  	  
The	  ‘Sovereign	  Fund’	  	  Law	  132	  (article	  3)	  mentions	  that	  net	  proceeds	  arising	  out	  petroleum	  activities	  or	  rights	  will	   be	  placed	   in	   a	   “sovereign	   fund”,	   leaving	   it	   to	   another	   law	   to	  prescribe	   its	   specific	  management.	  However,	  it	  does	  already	  specify	  that	  the	  fund	  as	  such	  will	  be	  designed	  for	  saving	  purposes,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  shall	  keep	  the	  capital	  and	  part	  of	  the	  proceeds	  “for	  future	  generations”,	  and	  only	  make	  available	  the	  dividends	  from	  investments	  for	  other,	  current	  purposes.	  From	  a	  perspective	  of	  international	  best	  practice,	  the	  very	  mentioning	  of	  the	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fund	   is	   congruent	   with	   the	   widely	   accepted	   notion	   that	   petroleum	   is	   a	   depletable	  resource	  and	  that,	  as	  such,	  there	  is	  no	  moral	  justification	  to	  spend	  it	  all	  by	  the	  generation	  that	  happens	   to	   stumble	  upon	   it.	  However,	  other	  motivating	   factors	  come	   into	  play	  as	  well,	   including	   policies	   to	   counter	   ‘Dutch	   disease’	   effects	   and	   stabilizing	   sharply	  fluctuating	  revenues	  associated	  with	  high	  price	  volatility	  in	  petroleum	  prices,	  intentions	  to	  use	   the	  dividends	   for	  developmental	  purposes	  and	  economic	  diversification	   (World	  Bank,	  2014).	  For	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  current	  article,	  the	  idea	  that	  such	  funds	  can	  be	  helpful	  in	   insulating	   revenue	  management	   from	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  politics	   and	   the	   risk	   of	  waste	   and	  corruption	   is	   most	   relevant.	   Such	   considerations	   have	   also	   informed	   the	   Lebanese	  intention	   to	   establish	   a	   petroleum	   fund.	   (Author’s	   interview	  with	   MEWR	   officials,	   12	  June	  2014)	  	  The	   problem	   is	   that	   worldwide	   experience	   learns	   that	   ‘sovereign	  wealth	   funds’	   often	  have	  done	  little	  to	  advance	  the	  goals	  for	  which	  they	  were	  established.	  In	  fact,	   they	  can	  even	  worsen	  the	  risk	  of	  corruption.	  (Revenue	  Watch,	  2014;	  Bulte	  &	  Damania,	  2008).	  In	  this	  context,	  of	  course,	   it	   is	  essential	   that	   there	  exist	  strict	  rules	   for	  withdrawals,	  clear	  and	   legally	   bolstered	   criteria	   or	   earmarks	   for	   expenditure,	   and	   high	   levels	   of	  transparency	  and	  accountability.	  	  	  Even	   so,	   more	   often	   than	   not,	   as	   one	   scholar	   on	   petroleum	   governance	   found,	  “politicians	   sweep	   aside	   institutional	   constraints	   to	   gain	   control	   over	   how	   a	   valuable	  resource	   is	  allocated	  and	  regulated—giving	   them	  the	  power	   to	  use	   it	   for	  patronage	  or	  corruption.”	   (Ross,	   2012).	   ‘Fund	   raiding’	   is	   the	   most	   striking	   example	   of	   this	   as,	   for	  instance	   in	   Libya	   under	  Muammar	   al-­‐Qadafi	   billions	   of	   dollars	   were	   siphoned	   off	   for	  luxury	  purchases,	   spent	  on	  white	  elephant	  projects	  and	  other	  dubious	   investments,	  or	  simply	   vanished	   in	  private	  bank	   accounts	   abroad.	   (Global	  Witness,	   2012)	   	  While	   such	  excesses	   cannot	   be	   ruled	   out	   in	   non-­‐dictatorships	   or	   even	   (semi-­‐)democracies,	   it	   is	  striking	   that	   blatant	   and	  massive	   ‘fund	   raiding’	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   trademark	   of	   heavily	  centralized	  and	  coercive	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  Given	  Lebanon’s	  unruly,	  fragmented,	  or	  pluralist	   political	   system	   (or,	   as	   one	   author	   called	   it	   less	   euphemistically,	   its	  “authoritarianism	   by	   diffusion”)	   (El	   Khazen,	   2003),	   the	   probability	   of	   fund	   raiding	  appears	   to	   be	   less	   acute	   except,	   perhaps,	   as	   the	   hapless	   experience	   of	   the	   Lebanese	  central	   bank	   shows,	   in	   times	  of	   full-­‐scale	   civil	  war	   (Al-­‐Ayyash,	   1997).	  A	  much	   greater	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risk,	  however,	  is	  that	  by	  design,	  or	  by	  reflecting	  the	  lowest	  common	  denominator	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  political	  class’	  demands	  and	  preferences,	  the	  institutional	  checks	  and	  balances	  on	  Lebanon’s	   sovereign	   fund	  will	  be	   too	  diluted	  and	   too	  weak	   to	  withstand	  escalating	  political	   pressures	   to	   make	   withdrawals,	   for	   instance	   to	   achieve	   or	   restore	   a	  ‘confessional	  balance’,	  or	   indeed	   to	  create	  opportunities	   for	  grand	  corruption	   (Eifer	  et	  al.,	   2003).	   Such	   concerns	   resonate	   with	   Lebanon’s	   experience	   with	   special	   funds	   and	  public	   sector	   agencies	   supposedly	   insulated	   from	   political	   bickering	   and	   interference;	  the	  Council	  for	  Development	  and	  Reconstruction,	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  South,	  the	  Fund	  for	  the	  Displaced	  all	  suffered	  from	  constant	  political	  interference,	  wasteful	  expenditure	  and	  corruption.	  (Leenders,	  2012)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Even	   with	   effective	   management,	   a	   sovereign	   fund	   will	   not	   be	   a	   guarantee	   that	   all	  resources	   that	   it	   releases	   will	   be	   effectively	   spent	   without	   waste,	   cronyism,	   and	  corruption.	   For	   one,	   such	   will	   be	   dependent	   on	   the	   implementing	   agencies	   including	  line-­‐ministries,	  especially	  if	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  revenues	  will	  be	  allocated,	  for	  instance,	  to	  infrastructural	   projects,	   initiatives	   enhancing	   social	   welfare	   provision	   and	   poverty	  alleviation.	   Partly	   due	   to	   Lebanon’s	   dismal	   record	   of	   institutional	   weakness,	   political	  interference,	   muhasasa,	   and	   corruption	   in	   public	   procurement	   and	   public	   welfare	  provision,	  some	  have	  already	  suggested	  radical	  alternatives	  to	  circumvent	  this	  problem.	  These	  include	  proposals	  to	  use	  petroleum	  revenues	  entirely	  to	  pay	  off	  Lebanon’s	   large	  public	   debt	   (CDL,	   25	   January	  2012),	   and	   spending	  petroleum	   revenues	  on	  direct	   cash	  transfers	  to	  all	  adult	  Lebanese	  citizens	  (Chatah,	  2012),	  as	  is	  done	  in	  various	  ways	  in	  the	  oil-­‐rich	   US	   state	   of	   Alaska,	   in	   Bolivia,	   East	   Timor,	   and	   Mongolia	   (Gillies,	   2010;	   Ross,	  2012).	  	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  Given	  Lebanon’s	   consistently	  disappointing	  performance	   in	   the	  past	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  sound	  institution-­‐building	  and	  countering	  corruption,	  it	  certainly	  does	  not	  have	  a	  good	  head	   start	   for	   good	   petroleum	   governance.	  Many	   understandably	   fear	   that	   due	   to	   the	  country’s	   inability	   to	   learn	   from	   its	   checkered	   record	   of	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction,	  abundant	   resources	   made	   available	   by	   a	   nascent	   petroleum	   sector	   would	   cause	  Lebanon’s	  history	  of	  rampant	  corruption	  to	  repeat	  itself,	  the	  first	  time	  as	  a	  tragedy	  and	  the	  second	  as	  farce.10	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  By	  tracing	  already	  erected	  institutional	  and	  legal	  structures	  for	  the	  sector’s	  prospective	  path	  down	  the	  value	  chain	  this	  article	  identified	  various	  vulnerable	  locations	  and	  areas	  of	   specific	   concern,	   thereby	   giving	   ample	   grounds	   to	   be	   wary	   about	   the	   risks	   of	  corruption.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  article	  adopted	  a	  qualitative	  approach	  to	  assessing	  risks	  of	  corruption	  along	  the	  sector’s	  value	  chain;	  a	  perspective	  that	  was	  argued	  to	  better	  locate	  and	   understand	   such	   risks	   than	   large-­‐N	   quantitative	   analyses	   are	   able	   to.	   It	   added	  revenue	   management	   and	   expenditure	   dimensions	   to	   this	   approach,	   showing	   that	  opportunities	   for	   and	   risks	   of	   corruption	   may	   equally	   arise	   depending	   on	   what	  institutions	  are	  established	  to	  channel,	  spend	  or	  save	  revenues.	  The	  adopted	  approach	  has	   the	   added	   advantage	   of	   being	   intimately	   tuned	   to	   the	   local	   context	   of	   relevant	  institution	   building	   and	   the	   political	   settlement	   that	   undercuts	   it.	   As	   such,	   the	  framework	  proposed	  in	  this	  article	  may	  be	  useful	  for	  timely	  and	  informed	  assessments	  of	  the	  risks	  of	  corruption	  among	  (prospective)	  green	  field	  producers	  generally,	  both	  in	  the	  Levant	  Basin	  and	  beyond.	  	  To	   be	   comprehensive,	   of	   course,	   the	   analysis	   should	   be	   extended	   to	   any	   further	  institutional	  and	  policy	  steps	  Lebanon	  will	  take	  in	  the	  future,	  perhaps	  including	  the	  use	  of	   petroleum	   revenues	   to	   pay	   off	   the	   country’s	   public	   debt	   and/or	   for	   direct	   cash	  handouts.	   In	  addition,	   if	  or	  when	  petroleum	  governance	  structures	  develop	  further,	  an	  appraisal	  is	  necessary	  of	  the	  task	  of	  building	  and	  reforming	  a	  range	  of	  state	  institutions	  and	   agencies	   that	   are	   less	   directly	   involved	   in	   petroleum	   activities	   and	   yet	   crucial	   to	  their	   daily	   governance,	   including	   custom	   agencies,	   the	   judiciary,	   spending	   line-­‐ministries,	  and	  environmental	  protection	  agencies.	  	  	  In	  the	  end,	  much	  will	  come	  down	  to	  the	  volume	  of	  petroleum	  that	  will	  be	  extracted	  and	  the	  revenues	  that	  will	  be	  obtained	  from	  them.	  Beyond	  this	  what	  will	  matter	  a	  great	  deal	  is	   the	   Lebanese	   government’s	   discipline	   in	   what	   is	   for	   now	   sensibly	   designed	   as	   a	  gradual	   and	   phased	   approach	   to	   assigning	   the	   offshore	   blocks	   and	   opening	   them	   for	  production.	  This	  would	  not	  only	  make	   sense	   in	   terms	  of	   countering	   the	   risk	  of	   ‘Dutch	  disease’	   and	   bureaucratic	   overstretch,	   but	   also	   to	   mitigate	   the	   risk	   of	   widespread	  corruption	  bankrolled	  by	  large	  rent	  windfalls.	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Even	   when	   the	   risks	   of	   corruption	   need	   to	   be	   underscored,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	  Lebanon’s	  recent	  legislation	  and	  establishment	  of	  new	  relevant	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  LPA,	  suggest	  a	  degree	  of	  awareness	  of	  the	  complex	  issues	  involved	  and	  a	  determination	  by	  some	  to	  address	  them.	  Yet	  what	  has	  thus	  far	  been	  put	  in	  place	  or	  foreseen	  in	  terms	  of	  maximizing	   transparency	   and	   accountability	   is	   far	   from	   perfect	   let	   alone	   corruption-­‐proof.	   The	   greatest	   challenges	   in	   this	   context—given	   Lebanon’s	   awkward	   political	  settlement—will	   be	   to	   sort	   out	   the	   right	   politics	   to	   improve	   and	   strengthen	   the	  institutions	   and	   policies	   relevant	   to	   the	   sector	   that	   have	   already	   been	   put	   in	   place.	  Urgent	   attention	   in	   this	   respect	   should	   be	   granted	   to	   those	   links	   in	   the	   prospective	  industry’s	  value	  chain	  that	  this	  article	  showed	  to	  be	  already	  vulnerable	  to	  corruption.	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  1	  According	  to	  Lebanese	  government	  estimates	  and	  British	  geological	  surveyor	  Spectrum	  (Naharnet,	  10	  May	  2013;	  EIA,	  2014).	  	  2	  It	  was	  agreed	  with	  interviewees,	  unless	  stated	  otherwise,	  to	  cite	  them	  without	  attribution	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  a	  frank	  discussion.	  An	  additional	  imperative	  for	  doing	  so	  concerned	  the	  public	  servants	  interviewed	  for	  this	  article	  who	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  cited	  by	  name	  due	  to	  legal	  and	  political	  limitations.	  	  	  3	  An	  important	  exception	  whereby	  rich	  academic	  research	  informed	  petroleum	  governance	  debates	  involved	  the	  Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Pipeline	  project.	  Worryingly,	  even	  here	  corruption	  and	  misuse	  of	  natural	  resources	  followed	  as	  policymakers	  overruled	  the	  governance	  structures	  built	  on	  sound	  policy	  advice	  and	  expertise.	  (Pegg,	  2009)	  	  	  4	  On	  inaccurate	  reporting	  by	  the	  Lebanese	  media	  on	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  issue	  see	  Samir	  Kassir	  Foundation	  (2014).	  5	  Lebanon’s	  country	  score	  (on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  –	  highly	  corrupt-­‐	  to	  100	  –very	  clean)	  was	  27	  in	  2014	  and	  31	  in	  2005.	  	  	  	  6	  Making	  this	  argument,	  Leenders	  (2012)	  analyzes	  the	  Lebanese	  Central	  Bank	  as	  a	  control	  case	  sustaining	  relatively	  developed	  institutional	  guarantees	  and	  a	  far	  less	  checkered	  post-­‐Ta’if	  history	  of	  corruption.	  	  	  7	  Other	  key	  features	  of	  Lebanon’s	  post-­‐Ta’if	  political	  settlement	  are:	  a	  predominance	  of	  a	  ‘troika’	  of	  key	  policymakers	  and	  its	  politics	  of	  muhasasa;	  continuous	  attempts	  to	  circumvent	  built-­‐in	  stalemates	  and	  veto	  points	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  Ta’if	  Accord;	  extremely	  weak	  popular	  support	  for	  political	  elites	  and	  ensuing	  confessionalist	  and	  narrow,	  local	  agendas,	  and;	  the	  overriding	  role	  of	  Syria	  –	  and,	  after	  2005,	  multiple	  foreign	  countries-­‐-­‐	  in	  policymaking.	  (Leenders,	  2012)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  All	  laws	  and	  decrees	  are	  available	  at	  the	  website	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  Petroleum	  Administration.	  http://www.lpa.gov.lb	  	  9	  LPA	  board	  members’	  salaries	  and	  allowances	  reportedly	  average	  around	  USD	  200,000	  per	  year	  (Now.,	  28	  December	  2012).	  In	  comparison,	  judges	  are	  among	  Lebanon’s	  best-­‐paid	  state	  employees;	  yet	  even	  the	  highest-­‐ranking	  and	  –experienced	  judge	  does	  not	  earn	  more	  than	  USD	  43,344	  per	  year	  (albeit	  excluding	  allowances).	  (Republic	  of	  Lebanon	  /	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  December	  2011)	  	  	  	  10	  Karl	  Marx’s	  famous	  expression	  was	  similarly	  used	  in	  an	  article	  by	  Jim	  Quilty	  and	  Lysandra	  Ohrstom	  (2007)	  who,	  based	  on	  their	  analysis	  of	  widespread	  corruption	  and	  cronyism	  in	  Lebanon’s	  2006	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  reconstruction,	  argued	  that	  the	  country	  was	  already	  experiencing	  a	  farcical	  repeat	  of	  flawed	  reconstruction	  policies	  throughout	  the	  1990s.	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